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Abstract
Purpose – the study will be an investigation and articulation of the question “how 
does the Internet of Things (IoT) work”? 
Design/methodology/approach – a phenomenological investigation of comple-
mentarity with Contemporary Systems Thinking uncovering the temporal reflex of the 
Internet.  The Internet is to be understood to be a part of our life world of technology as 
well as a network of signs.
Findings – the Internet’s temporal reflex is more than the various combinations of 
past-present-future.
Practical implications – understanding the temporal reflex of the Internet is more 
than mere interconnectivity and a series of nodes but a self-processing system creating 
various possibilities which can be unintended consequences.  The unintended now can 
be anticipated and avoid significant disruptions.  
Originality/Value – the values of the research demonstrates an anticipatory di-
mension of the IoT in which we may foresee a type of fore-knowledge of what can or will 
be next. Such fore-knowledge allows risk mitigation at all levels of sociality; organizatio-
nal  cultural and societal.
Keywords: temporality, time reflex, Internet of Things, technology, recursion
Research type: research paper.
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Introduction
The framework of electronically connecting just about to any person and anything 
to one another, thereby improving interaction to and within diverse industries and 
households is called the Internet of Things (IoT). The trend makes us think differently 
about time and space as we experience them, for instance, on the shop floor of 
manufacturing enterprise like General Motors or Proctor and Gamble.
Same of the factor that are and or will be transformed relating to time and space. 
(a) Near and far will “feed” the same. Nothing will be “remote.” 
(b) There will be no top nor bottom viewpoint of happening inside the facility. 
(c) Who is to let into the network and who and where to leave our will be tough 
decisions. Suppliers to the company can help, will customers access be helpful. 
The meaning of trust will arise.
(d) Managing closeness. Human interaction with connected “things” will be 
a part of the data stream in workflow. No one can hide, personal space and 
privacy will have to be defined to keep the climate from becoming invasive. 
Also, people connected with their working in collaboration on cloud-based 
platforms will have to assert their identity and personality in these interactions.
(e) Data will flow quickly across the network which will wash away many 
beginnings and endings which determine product life cycle. Instead a cycle of 
redesign, re-engineering, updating and revisioning will keep many products 
“like new” for as long as end user wishes. A swirl of relentless innovation and 
evolution is extremely possible.
The transformation among other companies will be data-driven exponentially 
more than usual. Within the chaos, IoT organization theory can aid us in a bit to 
disentangle and or manage the ambiguity of the new time-space warp.
Innovation and time or the beginnnning of time traveling
In any innovation, the present includes a future horizon of expectations of relevant 
possibilities providing an orientation for experience and research activity. The relevant 
possibilities, belonging to the present project are part of the project in the mode of 
future horizon. The past horizon does not vanish into oblivion since it is required and 
retained for the comprehension of the future horizon. The present is thus a temporal 
field consisting of active past and future horizons constituting a field of orientations 
of action and experience. Hence each activity occurs within a temporal field where 
the comings future and retained past are co-present and are manifested in the activity 
with a given project. What has been accomplished by others and what is being done 
with the project, continues to be present for the understanding of what is being done 
and is about to be done. Moreover, what is about to be done is a condition for the 
understanding of what is and was done. For innovation such temporal awareness is 
relevant to the extent that the students and teachers will learn from the innovations of 
the past. How innovations were accomplished, what transformations in thinking and 
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application were relevant to surpass the achievements of the predecessors, and what 
possibilities were signified by such achievements. In this sense, time of learning and 
experience is a field. If human actions are based on temporal field then humans are 
not only temporal but also historical beings. This means that through actions humans 
make their history and since history arises through human action, then the very being 
of human is the history which she makes.
This means, furthermore, that although we may analyze “natural facts,“ their 
properties and temporal orientations, we shall discover that facts function and assume 
orientation within a context of significations, and this is more so with respect to the 
“facts” invented by humans through education. In principle, such “facts” are results of 
innovations from which one can learn how subsequent innovations can be achieved.
Not all events play a role in human activity; they are selected and interpreted in 
accordance with the significance they have in the context of a particular project and its 
horizons. Conversely, the horizons are also present selectively: significant possibilities 
are selected and insignificant rejected. In bio technologies Americans have been 
innovating in genetic engineering of food products, but learning such innovations 
by European young people requires the placing of this technology in European life 
world where genetically engineered vegetables are contested and thus the horizon of 
possibilities of innovation in this area will have to be postponed, and the arguments 
presented on the basis of values which would have to change if genetic engineering 
will be a domain selected for education. Thus the values of the past play a role in the 
future selectivity of what innovations are possible. Although our process of selectivity 
may leap over events, their historical continuity consists of their significance within 
the temporal field. Even if the events are past and causally no longer efficient, their 
significance is still present. This does not mean that the significance of events follows 
a linear succession; rather the significance of the past event belongs to the present 
temporal field and its horizons of possibilities. It either expands or contracts the 
horizons by permitting the selectivity of more or less remote events as relevant within 
the present temporal field of learning. It is also clear that the present field is multi-
layered and thus replete with options such that certain options are taken up while 
others remain present in a tacit mode to be activated if the horizon discloses their 
relevance and value.
The expansion of past horizon does not imply that the entire significance of history 
may be captured. There may be events whose significance and truth will manifest itself 
only in the future. Truth itself is historical and reveals itself in historical time. The 
teacher of science is also a historian who know how to read events not as facts but 
significatively; the teacher may see the relevance of some past events reflected on the 
future horizon. In brief, the significance of an event transcends its present toward the 
past and future and the mere factual description of the event. The same holds true of 
past and future events. Moreover, the future horizon may reveal hitherto unnoticed 
significance of past or present events and add to the constitution of continuity and 
unity of social events and their historical development.
Social technologies. 2015, 5(1): 44–61. 47
Life world and limits of selectivity 
An in-depth investigation of the temporal field of activity is by itself inadequate 
without an extensive study of life world structures as limitations to selectivity of 
significant and relevant events and possibilities. In the context delimited above, 
Luhmann has contributed extensively toward the understanding of the relationship 
between the temporal field and social structures. His suggestions are crucial for any 
progress in this area. Luhmann accepts the differentiation between temporal field and 
the theoretical-linear time and adds a qualification with respect to the selectivity of 
events. The past, present and future events assume significance and orientation not 
only within the temporal field of learning but also within the horizons, views, concepts 
and the prescribed selectivity by a life world. Consequently, the structure of the 
temporal field of learning is limited by life world and its selected-selectable possibilities. 
Moreover, the open horizons constitute to the region of possibilities outside the ken of 
the social structure: in terms of the social structure they are impossible. Yet precisely 
such “impossible-possibilities” define the limit of a life world and its horizons and pre-
delineates the orientation for fundamental innovations. An awareness of the limits of 
a life world and its possibilities is required for any fundamental innovative activity. Yet 
the awareness of such a limit assumes a presence of a possibility by which to judge the 
limit and toward which to orient the fundamental learning of innovations. Precisely 
at this point the dialogical process in education becomes the sharpest. Debating such 
limits, discovering what meaning factors are at play and how they can be challenged 
and transformed. 
It follows then, that within a life world context not all the possibilities are equal; 
some are more remote than others and thus not all are equally significant. It could be 
said that the socially impossible is the socially unrealizable; socially it is an impossible 
possibility and reveals the limits of a life world. Of course the interrelationships 
between the possible and impossible are quite complex. What may be possible 
politically may be only remotely possible or even impossible economically; what is 
possible economically may not be possible technologically. Thus certain events may 
be excluded for the time being and become past for the social system. (Religions had 
become a private matter and no longer mixed into political-public affairs.) Yet they 
may be reinstated as significant for the social future provided a shift in life world 
signification of events and temporal horizons has occurred. (Thus, more recently 
the same religions have assumed political meaning and shifted the interpretation of 
events thus transforming what is significant for today and the future). Of course, such 
a shift requires an understanding of “time-reflex” as a means of relating the social 
system to its possibilities and these in turn to the temporal field of action. The required 
complexities of time reflex cannot be here developed and will be reserved for the next 
section.
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Time reflex
Figure. Temporal Experience
Table. Foresight & Temporal Landscapes
Past Present Future
Past Past Past Past Present Past Future
Present Present Past Present Present Present Future
Future Future Past Future Present Future Future
Although there are two major aspects constituting time reflex, their structures are 
similar. Hence we shall deal with one and refer to the other when necessary. The limits 
of the socially possible constitute a temporal horizon for the particular society which 
reflects the process of current events. Such events are temporal and their orientation, 
selectivity and significance are reflected from the future and past horizons. This is the 
first time-reflex. Since events are temporal, then the time reflex is also temporal with 
constantly shifting possibilities at the limit of the socially possible. The limits of the 
socially possible are manifest only with respect to the socially impossible possibilities. 
These constitute the open horizon of the temporal field of learning which is the basis 
for the historical development and orientation of social process. This is the second time 
reflex. It reflects the limits of the socially possible. Since the social selectivity process 
of events requires temporal horizons of the socially possible, then the temporal field 
constitutes a prerequisite for the understanding of the social processes, their limits and 
historical transformations, showing, at this point the innovative achievements. Were 
we limited to the current social conditions and socially predelineated possibilities, 
as sociologists’ concept we are, then no fundamental scientific transformation could 
occur. This is not to deny the limitations constantly imposed by a life world and its 
possibilities; nevertheless such limitations are not absolute. We remain open within 
the temporal field of education which manifests the limits of the social structure and 
the possibilities of its transformation. Hence the temporal field is fundamental both for 
social transformation and for the relationship between social structure and its temporal 
development and orientation. This relationship can now be described as “time-reflex.”
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Any innovative learning functions within a life world and time and consequently 
assumes the temporal field. In fact, as already noted, such learning is totally correlated 
to the temporal field and its horizons. Hence let us take as an example of an activity 
of inquiring into society and its temporal process. The investigation is correlated to 
the selected events and possibilities of a given social structure; yet the investigation 
requires a limit from which a life world may be seen. We know that a life world as a 
system reproduces its own memory of the history of selectivity, of experience of the 
environment. A life world in its complexity of meanings, limits which experiences 
will count as relevant and valid and also the factors of the environment which will be 
relevant for learning and innovation. Yet beyond this it reconstructs a world-history of 
unaccomplished selectivity required to grasp the limit of its selectivity and introduce 
fundamental innovations that would change not only technologies, but also signify 
all other factors in a life world. Europe is facing a quandary of legal issues with respect 
to the speed of technological innovations. The laws that are available cannot handle 
the meaning and value of all the novelties implying a horizon of possibilities of novel 
laws, either as restrictions of technical innovations, or their delegation to specific 
areas of a European life world. Thus the “impossible possibilities” in a life world must 
be considered with respect to what they imply integrally across all other meaning 
levels of a life world. This complexity is part of the curriculum for innovation, and 
the benefits for society are vast, since the innovators will learn not only the ways 
to advance their field, but also what the advancement means for all other domains: 
economic, legal, value, moral, health, changing education, and political decisions. 
In brief, the temporal field horizon has an indefinite depth of temporal possibilities 
which reflect the temporal horizons of life world possibilities, their limits, and 
innovative transgressions. Hence time reflex, while relating a life world structure 
to the temporal field of learning, provides a fundamental context for the activity of 
innovative learning.
During the learning activity the present shifts from one event to another that 
include shifts not only in the horizons of the present but also in those of the present 
of the past and the present of the future. Shifts in the present of the present include 
shifts in its horizons and correlatively call for the shifts in the horizons of the presents 
of past and future. Yet such a call is possible on the basis of the time reflex. The 
present temporal field, due to its time reflex, extends and overlaps with past and 
future temporal fields. What were still future possibilities and even impossibilities for 
the present of the past, may be realized in the present and even establish our future 
horizon of not yet realized possibilities and limiting impossibilities. This appears in 
various ways. For example in a legal domain of a life world, a constitution, written 
in the past, may be articulated at present for its possible reinterpretation as to what it 
might have meant in the past and what such reinterpretation might mean for future 
cases involving previously unimagined innovations. 
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Time reflex and world
The concept of world is critical to the enterprise of founding a communication-
based theory of the social and cultural. We quote at length from Luhmann (1995) to 
set the stage for subsequent reflections: The relationship between meaning and world 
can be described as the concept of decentering. As meaning the world is accessible 
everywhere: in every situation, in any detail, at each point of the scale from concrete 
to abstract. 
At the same time, the world is more than a mere sum comprehending all possibilities, 
all meaning references. It is not just the sum, but the unity of these possibilities above 
all, this means, that the world horizon for every difference guarantees its own unity 
as difference. It sublates the difference in all perspectives from individual systems, in 
that for every system the world is the unity of its own difference between system and 
environment. Efforts to view technology, politics, and culture set in motion a quest 
to reconsider the cultural/political categories of history, individuation, praxis, and 
power in concrete phenomena. Such reconsiderations of these categories have been 
cast in a pure communication structure of dialogic undermining cherished glosses 
of communication praxis, dialectical historicism, culture, and text as interpretive 
explanations of concrete political life. However, the concept of world needs to be 
explored as a universal presumption. Therefore, world as the concrete fundament of 
life appears through presentation and de-presentation and concrete possibilities. 
The way of world cannot be encountered in the context of human-world 
relationship. Only in a non-thinking moment can we think of human-world 
relationships as an encounter between two things. The dominant in the model is 
inner-worldly relationships. Each inner-worldly thing has an identity of self and 
other-relatedness where the sense of identity demands the sense of difference : Identity 
and difference belong together. It is one of the basic ontological aspects in the Western 
tradition ending in Hegel’s dialectic of identity and difference. And the human, seen as 
inner-worldly, is destined by “self” and “other” relationships. The question is whether 
such a destiny, a de-termination, makes sense without a much deeper and accessible 
way pervading the human. World is not the most extreme limit and boundary of inner-
worldly things; it is not a framework or a container. Humans do not take residence in 
the world as worms in an apple or money in a bank. All the trusted modalities of 
“being-in” of things are not applicable – not even metaphorically. World is not an 
object or a region, a time of all times, regardless of our evocations of finitude and 
infinity. Neither is world the sum of all humanly known objects and subjects. The sum 
of such knowledge is no less remote from the world as the knowledge of an individual. 
We, while in the world, encounter things and others, yet nowhere do we encounter the 
world as a thing, an object, or another. Rather, world is an openness to things and of 
things. After all, the various regions of things, the living, the dying, the tactile and the 
caressable, have not been exhausted – and perhaps are not exhaustible – and only our 
meager knowledge is limited.
World understanding must encompass the notions of being, context, consciousness, 
and the self-understanding of the human. Thus, we must consider how it I that the 
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inner-worldly ways transmute into objects for consciousness. Husserl points to the 
main sail of cosmological thought: the differences between the world-lending of and 
the inner worldly objectivity-subjectivity (and their relationship) of events. Events 
appear either in themselves or for us. But is this all that there is: the appearing things, 
the things and their appearance to us? What of timing, spacing, lighting changing, 
and so forth? Intentionality falls short. Timing seems closer to world. This maybe 
the joining of human openness for world and world’s self-constitution—the joining 
where timing and world-time are not yet distinct. If this is the case, then reflection is 
a temporalization of a temporalization with pre-given distances and nearnesses of time 
and space, of significative dimensions assumed both in prereflective moves and reflection 
upon such moves. Reflection is therefore basically a world reflex, allowing a movement 
of temporalization within time, and time as such must here be understood a-temporally 
(alpha privitive).
It is possible to glimpse now, although in a sketchy manner, world-time, or at least to 
suggest a way more akin to world-time. Let us think along the world-expansive present 
and the way that it may lend motion and the presence of all things and events. We must 
think of the world-expansive dimensions and how they lend the motion of emergence 
into presence and demise into absence. This worldly motion of lending emergence and 
demise should not be identified with the world-expansive everyday world transition. 
The everyday world and the world-time must be distinguished in terms of cosmological 
difference. It must also be noted that, insofar as things and events have an expanse 
from not-yet, present, and no-longer, then the inner-temporal phenomena must also 
be thought temporally. It has been an old habit to think that the things and events must 
be given – or better, show themselves – only now. Past is no more, and future is not 
yet. But, if things and events are not essential but temporal, then we cannot think an 
event without the everyday horizons and the transition from one to the other. Thus, the 
appearance of something or an event is basically an appearing and also a disappearing. 
(An appearance here must be understood as a temporal formation of something or 
an event whereby phenomena are lent their configurations along the transition of the 
world-expansive, everyday dimensions of not-yet, present, and no-longer.)
There is not only a tension, but also a forming/deformation. This means that one 
cannot validly proclaim that the thing or event has a form, or had a form which it 
lost, since the loss is a losing and at the same time a formation along the traces of 
deformation. The deformation is a formation tracing the deformation in itself; this 
is one aspect of depth-time, since the formation is not after the deformation but 
is the depth of the no-longer tracing itself in the deformation. The formation and 
deformation and the deformation-formation have a transparent depth. The depth 
is possible if we understand the notion events, but as a self-formation of temporal 
configurations; temporal depth is the very transparent visibility of things.
If we were to think along the three temporal dimensions, we could have a way where 
there is a formation-deformation-formation identical with those temporal dimensions 
whereby the present formation is an inscription of temporal configuration and is at 
the same time a deformation transparent through the formation as its temporal depth 
“toward the past” and a formation transparent with its “temporal future.” In brief, 
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every phenomenon is not merely an appearance of a thing or an event as a property, but 
more fundamentally a transparency of the dimensional depth of time, not “one after 
the other.” Hence the world expansive transition lends things and events their face, but 
the face is also a worldly face and not merely a thing-appearance – beyond things in the 
world. The inner-worldly appearance is the “transition” across the time dimensions. 
The problem of world-time lies in the way that it “lets phenomena be” that is the 
phenomenality of the appearance. What lends appearances their phenomenality is the 
dimensional shift, the formation-deformation-formation as dimensional time-depth 
inscribing the appearance of things which is not identical with the now characteristics 
of things. Yet, the phenomena here are not appearances unto the subject; at best, the 
subject is identical with the shift of the temporal dimensions. Nevertheless, we can 
have an initial glimpse, even if it is still in terms of the everyday world dimensions, 
into the world-time as not successive but as all-pervasive. It must be noted that here 
the ontological status of the traditional notion of appearance is lost. Appearance 
was either a Topological study – line, plane, mapping – missing depth as a critical 
dimension. In this case it is neither; phenomenon, although attributable to a thing or 
an event, is ultimately a dimension lending things their “while” and apparition. 
The worldly appearance is time-lent. It is temporal and spatial: spacelent. All 
everyday spaces, such as place-space, thing’s expansive space, everyday distances, 
distantiations and kinships, are only in a world-space which is neither a big space 
nor a place of all places, nor can it have a stretch since all stretches, distantiations, 
and places are pervaded by world-space. The world-space is a spacing of the everyday 
world of things in distances, places, and expansive spaces, and hence their casting 
of shadows across each other, which gives coloration, resounding and touch to all 
temporal phenomena. Space, in spacing, lends things their size, weight, expanse, and 
location, but in such a way that spacing vibrates across all things and events without 
being identical with them.
Thus, both world-dimensional time, as lending phenomena their phenomenality, 
and space as spacing the everyday things and events in their locations, affinities, and 
remoteness, have a “movement” which is not one of the inner-worldly movements, 
and which cannot be understood in the categories of traditional philosophies. It is a 
cosmological motion. If we are to think this motion as a transition from the future 
to the present and from the present to the past, we would be using the notion of 
transition and time in an inner-worldly, everyday way – a way of succession and a 
successive movement. How then are we to think this worldly movement? We must 
think the world-dimensional present, past, and future back to the timing of world 
where the transition occurs – not from the future to the present and the past, but the 
way of world-timing where such differentiations falter without being lost. We must 
think of transition intransitively.
The non-ontological presence of past and future is not simply an absence of 
things or even nothing, but rather has a temporal sense, a sense that is quite difficult 
to capture. It cannot be thought in terms of absence, since absence is pre-positional. 
With Aristotle and Augustine, there emerges a further question: How is it that, in 
explicating time, they employ a spatial model, specifically when Augustine established 
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a total disjunction between space and time? Space is external; time is in the soul. When 
Augustine points out that “a while” can either be long or short and since only entities 
can be long or short, then he operates with a model of spatial stretches, such as a path. 
Whatever is extended in space may not change its extension although it has changed 
time. The “road stretch” is still there, although yesterday is no longer. Hence, we must 
reconsider whether time is a stretch. We must ask whether there is a present time and 
whether it can be long or short. We, of course, speak of the time stretch in terms of 
the present century, present year, and may call them a long stretch of time. But how is 
the past hundred years the present? Obviously, it is not given contemporaneously as a 
stretch in space, i.e., as a stretch of the road. We speak of the present century as “ours.” 
Only the present year is present, but obviously, even this year is not “present” since 
most of it is gone and some of it is yet to be finished. If we push this kind of notion of 
the present, we shall end up with the Zenonian and Aristotelian division of time into 
an infinite point. But such an indivisible point is never encountered. All attempts to 
consider time as present slips away into past and future. Therefore, we cannot think of 
the present as an extension. 
When we attempt to think the world-movement, then we have to trace back from 
the transition of world expansive dimensions of not-yet, present, and no longer to the 
world-space-time movement. To add a different turn, to think the world means to 
show how the world-movement manifests itself in, and makes possible the appearance 
of, the dimensional future, present, and past, namely so that the emergence of the 
future, present, and past are possible – a possibility constituting the appearance of 
phenomena. It could be said that all everyday “whiles” are contained within the world-
expansive dimensions, although this metaphor must be de-spatialized. However, we 
cannot say that the world-expansive dimensions are “in” the world, nor can we say 
that the world-expansive time is an infinite “while,” since the infinite stretch smacks 
of a line from “now” in both directions. From my “now,” I stretch the “whiles,” or even 
array them endlessly in both directions. Neither can world-time-space nor movement 
be infinite since we would revert back to an inner-worldly everyday. In the timing of 
the world across the world-expansive dimensions, the world-time is neither a “while” 
nor a duration since all “whiles” and durations are in the world; hence, the world-time 
would not endure. How does the world “time” cross all world-expansive dimensions? 
How does the world-space “space” all inner-worldly events and things? How does the 
world institute the movement of spatio-temporal dimensions? How are we to think 
the world-depth? For phenomenology, the experienced elements such as chromatic 
qualities or audial durations are no longer the qualities of things or qualifications of 
the subject-soul. They belong to experience which can be said to be worldly in the 
sense that they are more akin to the traditionally neglected world than to subjects and 
objects. The same can be said of time and space. Time and space are certainly not “in” 
the subject, neither are objects described phenomenologically “in” time and space.
The fleshly present things of my surrounding world constitute the region of my 
perceptual field. In diverse ways, I am tuned to the surroundings in terms of use, 
misuse, valuation, interrogation, wonder, and habit. In all this, I am related to the 
surroundings perceptually; thus, the perceptual field and I are co-present. Yet, in the 
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perceptual field, I find that things – my surroundings – are not closed from moment 
to moment. I find an aura, a horizon; my perceptual island is neither objective nor 
subjective, nor is the aura that spreads “beyond” the island. Yet, the aura is given 
differently than the present perceptual field. It is given as re-presented, as absent in 
the presence. But we must note that the re-presentation must be interpreted in the 
worldly sense. This means that we cannot speak here of re-presentation as an act of 
consciousness but as a temporal event of time-in-time. This means that we are not 
concerned with the protensional act or the retentional capacity but from a time arc, 
a time curve upon itself. Although we may be re-presenting things of the past, what 
makes the re-presentation possible is the past’s presence and the future’s presence exactly 
in the perceptual field, which has an aura not spreading toward the past and future 
only, but coming from the past and the future toward the perceptual present. In the 
phenomenal field, the field of perception and its aural significations, we are related 
in presentational3 and re-presentational modalities. We relate presentationally to the 
things in our surroundings and re-presentationally to the aural significations in terms 
of remembered and expected surroundings. Thus, we have an immediate stance to our 
surroundings as presented and represented. Both belong to our world. In terms of the 
notion of presentation, and re-presentation, we must ask: What is the relationship of 
presentation and re-presentation to world-time? (Pilotta & Mickunas, 1990)
Before we can answer such a question in any manner, we must gain a closer 
understanding of the notions of presentation and re-presentation within the 
transcendental region. The essential aspect of “presenting acts” consists in their being 
oriented to the “intentional objectivity.” The thing shows itself in its corporeity. Their 
presence is related to the living present and is to be understood as “presenting.” In 
contrast, the “re-presenting acts” do not show the object as bodily present but as re-
presented. The relationship of the re-presentational act to the presentational act is 
understood by transcendental phenomenology as a “modification” of the act and 
the object of the act. When I re-present a perceived something, the perceiving is 
co-re-presented without thematization. A representing act, relating to a presenting 
perceptual act, has the character of “simultaneous occurrence” (Gleichsamvollzug). 
In the re-presentational act, there is constituted the re-presented perceptual object 
and the co-re-presented perceptual act. Yet, as an act it too has its own temporality. 
The essential moment of a re-presentational act – regardless of what sort of re-
presentation – must be seen in the “inner-penetration.” The inner-penetration of a 
dual lived presence: the presence of re-presenting and the imagined presence of the 
imagined perceiving; the presently re-presented something and the imagined presence 
of the imagined perceived something. See Pilotta (1979).
The basic kinds of representing acts are determined in terms of temporal horizon:
• Representation in the time horizon of the past is recollection.
• Representation in the time horizon of the future is pre-recollection or 
expectation.
• Representation in the time-horizon of the present is presentrecollection.
The manner in which the co-re-presentation, i.e., a-presentation, corresponds 
to a time-horizon is to be explicated shortly. While the presenting perception is 
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oriented to the bodily-perceptually present, the recollection relates to the no-longer 
present and expectation to the not-yet present, the present recollection relates to the 
present not given in perceptual corporeity. Recollection points to the “having been 
at the present,” as in presentational perception, which “has been” for the person. It 
intrudes into my conscious past; it actualizes the in-actual memory constituted from 
retentional consciousness phases. In recollection, we must differentiate between 
an actualizing representation from not-yet-actualized memory awareness and the 
recalling of something forgotten. The forgotten is such that it itself was once in-
actual memory knowledge. Before we turn to a phenomenological analysis of the 
temporal constitution of the perceptual objects and their temporality, in order to 
lead them toward cosmological reinterpretation, let us briefly depict perception and 
the perception field by employing some of the important insights of Husserl (1964). 
In perception, we are related to something that is corporeally present and is already 
displaying itself. The perceptual field is correlated to perceptual sense. The sense 
which lends an obvious perceptual fullness is the facing-sense with vision as one of 
its aspects. There is a distinction between distant-sense and near-sense. Distant-sense 
consists of facing-sense with vision and hearing as its aspects; the near-sense consists 
of tactility, taste, and smell. The notion of distant-sense means that the experienced 
must be spatially separated from the perceiver. Near-sense means that the experienced 
must be without spatial mediation. Each perceptual sense has a specific sense-field, 
and an analysis of perception must describe the various sense-fields. We shall not, at 
the present, describe the various sense-fields.
Hence, by perception we shall mean “a limited notion of perception in terms 
of face-perception and its temporality.” We shall nevertheless note that Husserl’s 
analyses of time are grounded in the hearing-field, since for him audiality, such as tone 
or melody, constitutes temporal events par-excellence. The perceptual field of face-
sense not only includes the immediately present things, the near things and events, 
but also the distant things and events. The institution of nearness is grounded in the 
un-thematized null-point of the body; but the body, as an inner-penetration of full 
perceptual fields is a constant kinesthetic formation-deformation of various fields and 
nearnesses-distances. Hence, body has a most significant play in the constitution of 
the perceptual fields. Although, when we are speaking of perceptual fields at this stage 
of our considerations we are not speaking about subjective processes, nevertheless 
one of the references in the field is the null-point, which we may call “body.” It must 
be noted that the null-point need not assume a privileged position; any point may be 
called “here” and the point need not be spatial; it could be dimensional, e.g. when we 
say “right here in this town . . .” or “here on earth . . .” Any point may be taken as an 
orientation point in the perceptual field. In attempting to avoid something, we are 
riveted on that something as a point from which our body orients itself, i.e., inscribes 
various configurations of avoidance, such as going around it, going out of the way 
to avoid it, crawling, tiptoeing, and so forth. The perceptual field can be “attached” 
to anything as its “center,” although such an attachment is eventually unnecessary 
and, in fact impossible if the substantive attitude and spatial points are secondary 
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phenomena, i.e., if we cannot discover any point which is not itself dimensional and 
things which themselves are not figurative. 
But in order to understand the perceptual field we return to the body as it 
functioned in early phenomenology. We find here two descriptive orientations: on the 
one hand, the way we experience our bodily movements in the perceptual processes, 
and on the other, the dependence of the perceptual field and the way that things show 
themselves on the positionality of the body. The first orientation is called kinesthetic, 
and the other has to do with the shadings (Abschattungen) of the spatio-temporal 
things. The objects toward which our perceptual ray is oriented show themselves in 
their corporeal presence. The significance of this Husserlian notion suggesting the 
original givenness – the original presence of entities – shows that the corporeity of 
the given is related to the perceiving body. Within the process of bodily perception, 
there is the “corporeal present.” We can have the corporeal presence of things only 
and insofar as we are corporeal. This situation can be shown in terms of both of the 
descriptive orientations suggested above. Husserl (1973) calls the material things 
Aistheta insofar as they are related to the body and its Aisthesis. He calls the body 
“the means of all perception” which “is present necessarily in all perception” (207). 
The perceptual processes of experience, such as the seeing or touching of things, 
involve body not only perceptually but also with respect to the “accompanying series 
of kinesthetic. The kinesthetic “impressions” may be localized in the bodily member, 
such as hand, eye, and so forth. The kinesthetic series constitute the manner – the field – 
in which our body is “by the things.” The perceptual thing is present in accordance with 
our bodily position, the position of the eye, the movement of the head, the movement 
of tactility across the hand. At the same time, the body assumes a null-point, as a point 
of orientations within the perceptual field. From this, there emerge the orientations 
of the surrounding world toward the body. They are on the right or left, behind or 
to the side, low or in front, high or parallel to me. Thus, the orientation of things to 
the body and its fields of perception is ruled by perspectives and partial views, i.e., 
shadings. One sees the thing’s surface, runs across it with a hand, and thus constitutes 
various perspectives; one does not, at present, see the other side, the bottom or the 
three back legs; yet, one means the entire table. The unperceived aspects are, to speak 
with Husserl, given a-presentatively. One can bring them to presence by varying one’s 
position; yet, one is always present to one or the other side, while the non-present 
sides are a-present. In each perceptual accomplishment, there is continually a partial 
section of something. All the aspects not given presentatively constitute the horizon of 
the a-presentatively given. If one goes around the things, one continuously penetrates 
the horizon of the a-presentation and the just-perceived aspects of the same thing sink 
into a-presentation.
The world-time does not possess n attribute of being an all-encompassing 
something to which we relate from a particular “point.” Now, if we bracket the 
protentional-retentional and notice that there is distancing and nearing, we have not 
yet said that it is distancing and nearing, into a particular temporal orientation, such 
as past or future. It has been assumed for too long that if it is distancing, then it must 
be sinking into the past, and if it is nearing, it must be coming from the future. But 
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something could be distancing into the future, such as a goal which yesterday was 
near and which today is much more remote. The same thing is true with the past. 
Some unholy deed “in the past” is finally catching up to someone – it is nearing. Prior 
to temporal localization, there is the depth. Thus, the present does not emerge from 
a primal impression; rather, all impressions emerge, approach, and distance without 
any assumed temporal orientation. Thus, if there is a “time-understanding,” it is not 
derivable from the anthropos. Terminologies, such as “experienced time,” “lived time,” 
“projected time,” and such, add nothing to the way “we are” temporal. The present is a 
way that all events are, including “us” by instituting all the gestures we subscribe to the 
depth of the present and a field of presences. In this respect, when we speak of the no-
longer and the not-yet, we are not necessarily speaking about past and future but about 
the present depth; were we to say that something is coming to me from a future, we 
would be merely saying that it is traveling on a line from Paris to me, traversing space, 
and it has not yet traversed sufficient space to reach me. Yet, that traveling is present 
and is not coming from the future; as I sit awaiting, the traveling is already occurring 
and the traveler will simply emerge from the horizon which is neither the future nor 
the past. The present is not an impressional moment but a depth that can be best 
articulated, at least for now, in the Husserlian terms of determinable indeterminacy, 
rather than in the Heideggerian notions of nearness and distance, which smack too 
much of spatiality.
The above notion of indeterminate-determinable depth contains not only depth 
articulations but also horizon articulations with determinable indeterminacy. Of note 
here is the loss of a temporal event from future to the present to the past. Take sound, 
which always played a role in the Husserlian analysis of a temporal event, and we shall 
hear that the temporal continuation of sound is not given, nor is it given as a rhythm, 
although sound can be articulated as a rhythm. It is more akin to a dimension with 
depth and indeterminate indeterminable limits within which both continuation and 
rhythm constitute specific articulations. The same can be said of visual area. Although 
we still use the term horizon, it also carries a notion of a spatial expanse, so to speak, 
where the sky meets the earth. This implies a sphere which is more spatial fullness 
and Parmenidean being than temporal horizon. But if this is spatial, then what is the 
temporal horizon? A horizon toward which these spatial horizons move? But that 
would simply suggest a sphere in a sphere. This would lead us nowhere. The time-
depth mentioned above still contains the notion of depth which may hint at spatiality, 
yet let us live with it for a while and connect with our earlier descriptions. Coming 
from the depth is not coming from the future, and hence when something shows up on 
the future horizon, it had its presence in the depth. If I say that Hilary is coming from 
New York, but she is not yet here, she does not sit there perched on a future horizon; 
she is present in the expansive world presence and the “future horizon” is merely a 
modulation of the present. What is suggested is that the horizons are articulations of 
the present depth by anything, perception or consciousness being only one modality 
among others, such as a sway of a sapling in the wind, which corresponds with the 
protentional-retentional consciousness. It must also be noted that, with each sway, the 
“previous” are not in the “past,” but rather constitute the continuously self-configuring 
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depth. The horizons also move in depth with the continuous sway by constituting the 
indeterminate determinable limits of the sway, of protention retention, of memory 
and expectation. Hence, Hilary’s coming from New York is a movement of the 
present with horizons, such as farther and nearer, and so forth. Of note is that the 
horizons may be “parallel” with the depth, yet they, too, have horizons of determinate 
indeterminacy, each of those having its own depth.
How are we then to announce this depth? Let us listen to the irrupting presence 
echoed by sound welling into a dimension without any successive localities or 
continuations, since continuation is traceable within it only as one of its modalities. 
The analysis of the linear continuation of sound or time shaded by sound lacks a 
dimensional depth given cosmologically. Let us look at the irrupting time shaded by 
a flicker of light: it inscribes constantly waning protrusions which are immediately 
pervaded by others, dominated by intersections, thus building a constantly spreading 
depth which is not complete but is intersected, pervaded, and re-dimensioned by 
other irruptions; it is not light that pervades light, but time dimensions which pervade 
time dimensions, which are temporalizations of time. We are apt to think that the light 
pervades and dominates or manages space and time in some dimensional way, but this 
is somewhat short since it assumes that darkness is space to be shaped by light; but 
the contrast is just as valid; darkness protrudes and pervades the light, and this simply 
means a play of temporal dimensions which cannot be oriented. Rather, it is a play of 
building of depths, not from me toward the depth, but from a depth that wells with 
light and darkness, sound and silence, as colorations and echoes of time. The “edge” 
of this upwelling of a particular time dimension constitutes a horizon which may be 
called a-consciousness-horizon; it is to be noted that this horizon is no longer future 
or past but a dimension of depth which is pervading another dimension that includes 
me; I am in darkness, and the dawning light, inscribing a depth of sky, begins to well 
and intrude into the darkness wherein I had my residence. These metaphors are mere 
colorations of a more fundamental sway.
The present is a dimension with depths, horizons, pervading configurations, and 
defigurations, but it is also world-wide; all spatio-temporal intrusions, upsurgences, 
and diffusions are present. It must be noted that what once were called “things” are 
now, perhaps, slower spatio-temporal configurations than are flashes of light or 
audial explosions. Nevertheless, every “expression” of the thing is a spatio-temporal 
configuration in motion, spreading a depth and a horizon. Hence, we can no longer 
speak of the place of a thing as its outer limit or of its space in terms of other spatial 
things – since every aspect of the thing is intentional with incessant configurations and 
defigurations. The question that emerges is whether the sum of the self-configuring depth 
with its intertwining auras and intrusions is identical with the all-pervasive present.
If we were to understand the sound as flowing, we would be thinking in terms of 
horizons of time within which the flow takes place. Moreover, we would understand 
this temporal event as an inner-timely – and not timely or worldly – event. Even if we 
were to assume that the sound is continuous, as if on a line, we would be also present to 
a silence which is not identical with the continuation of the sound but present “before 
and after and during” the sound, and in such a way that it is not only the sound that 
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breaks the silence but also that the silence resounds in various ways in the sound. The 
sound thus ceases to be a continuous flow of future into the present and into the past, 
but already implicates a silent dimension of the present which is not continuous but 
irrupting in the very sound.
Whatever we now would call the conscious-flow of audiality would be a complex 
trace of the world-depth: the protentional-retentional is now identical with the 
continuous layering into depth of the sway of the tree in the wind. Consciousness 
thus begins to vanish in favor of identity with the world traces. The vanishing of the 
subject is a gain of the world, but no longer in the sense that the subject somehow 
mirrors or reflects the world and thus becomes anonymous, whereby the anonymity 
could be discovered by reflection; reflection would not find a subject, but rather the 
world traces with the added attraction of reflection which may simply be a delayed 
continuation of the traces. Let us take the protentional-retentional (past-future) 
consciousness in its ultimate a-temporal sense and note that it names a constant, 
changeless shift, and in such a way that the shift does not pass but builds an expansion 
with continuous deepening, and this expansion and deepening are not articulations 
of a pre-given temporality or a field, but are identical with an emergence of the field. 
That is why the a-temporal protention-retention are nowhere to be found, and the 
instituted protending acts and retending acts are at best secondary; it is nowhere and 
at no time because it is the very presence of emergent and self-articulating temporality 
manifested, or given a presentational value, by what we call consciousness. In terms of 
the present, it could be said that “by the time” the sound emerges for consciousness—
comes within the consciousness horizon – it has been welling up in its silence, and 
consciousness constitutes its continuous articulation. It could be said that consciousness 
is one modality in which sound becomes audible. Here again, we encounter a clue 
comprised of consciousness, which points to the horizons, but in such a way that these 
consciousness horizons are a way that the upwelling sound sifts through, pervades, and 
encompasses the consciousness and indeed constitutes it; with its depth, it institutes 
a limit called consciousness-horizons, and by emerging with depth-articulations, it 
constantly transfigures the horizons and thus constitutes consciousness articulation, 
called “temporalization,” which fundamentally is the sound’s articulation of time. 
Consciousness, as constant retending-protending, sinking and drawing, is identical 
with the emergence of time echoed by sound, or shaded by color. This is what allows 
transcendental phenomenology to talk of the empty form of time; it is the silent 
upsurge that wells into horizons of sound; strip away the sound, and what remains is 
“pure time,” except that its conscious horizons are an articulated limit; a trace across 
the depth and a constant waver from horizon to horizon is identical with the tracing 
of that depth. The present then has a world-wide depth which does not come toward 
consciousness, but which is always through consciousness, and when consciousness 
covers its self-temporalization, it also discovers itself in an “incessant streaming.” This 
streaming is one articulation of the presence shaded either in the chromatic endurance 
or echoed in some tonicity; but it is to be noted that such a chromatic endurance 
and echoed tonicity may “temporalize” everything. The temporalizing of cosmological 
difference gives the “world depth” and allows us to abandon the unconscious as the 
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repository of desires, myths, and magic in/of world dimensions. And it is within some 
degree of possibility that we are de-essentialized through temporalization. Thus, we 
may be able to state with methodological and conceptual clarity that every “body,” 
to the extent that it is conceived spatially, is nothing but a solidified, crystallized, and 
materialized time, which requires the formation and solidification of space to unfold. 
Space here may be construed as a field of tension of principles: the latency of space and 
the acuteness of the intensification of time.
Speculation 
• Instead of three horizons of time, we suggest there are five: 
1) present; 
2) past; 
3) future – as the time of actuality,
4) space;
5) possibility.
• Time is a five-fold unity of the severing of past, future, space, possibility, and 
field intentionality (present).
• Possibility, as the fifth horizon, means world constitution, as the unity of the 
saving of time and the filling of time 
The five temporalities allow for the following:
a.  Networks select different nodes (person, organization) relating to structural 
coupling with system and environment. With respect to information it seems to 
be the image of a “new” world which is most intense to meet on the net, anytime, 
anywhere, anyone and with anonymity and without ever meeting others.
b. Consumers have engaged for a while now in “time shifting” in delaying, 
postponing, recording, medias in a non-sequential order, anytime, anywhere. 
The world of the net embodies a fascinating characteristic which is almost a 
free-floating communication that is only loosely coupled to “actors” who are 
trying of multiple identities. The time horizon of sound tech/media is quite 
malleable. This is starting to be demonstrated in the analysis of networks.
c. Network analysis started gaining force as the “Net” came available in about 
1990. Currently, globalization and mobile telephony have perforated the 
interest and research into “Net”/network.
Time stretching and time-space compression have been descriptions of the 
globalization process and communications/information/entertainment/etc.. New 
ecosystem has arrived with the smart phone, decentering the centrality of the siloed 
industries, mentioned above. Visualize the industries above as a piece of fruit in a still 
life painting. The fruit is not lined up horizontally side by side but overlapping each 
other horizontally or they can be vertically overlapping each other in a mobile phasing 
in and out in every direction. Each piece of fruit is a node and edges are the relating 
to the other pieces of fruit which align as neighbors, with differing neighbors and 
clustering of neighbors.
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Until recently, network analysis has been based on static network perspective in 
which links and nodes are assumed to exist at any “point” in time. Recently is has 
found that high complex network are not active continuously but occur in specific 
temporal patterns. In recent investigation the fact is in many real world systems the 
next interaction of a node is not independent of the node it has interacted with shortly 
before.
Also, it has not been recognized that complex systems, particularly social technical 
systems are a layering of networks in which the interaction within each network and 
across each of the layers pass through each other. The dynamism of layered systems 
demonstrates the non-linearity of temporal relationship and need to be measured 
in between the relational preference of nodes. Intra-network and extra-network are 
compressed neighbors.
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